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The [recent] wave of public employee disputes from Harrisburg
to Seattle is the likely forerunner of an era of turbulence in the
public employees' sector. It is as freighted with political and eco-
nomic dynamite as the mine and factory organizing disputes of the
1930s.1
Employees in the United States have become increasingly deter-
mined not to be left out of the "scramble for money." 2 During the
1970's, both public and private employees have been especially con-
cerned about economic conditions.3 The cost of living has increased
each year since 1950.4 Despite such economic indicators, during the
1. Broder, Public Employee is Labor's Woe, San Diego Evening Tribune,
Sept. 3, 1975, at B-2, col. 4. David Broder is a political analyst whose syndi-
cated articles often focus on public employee-employer relations. Because
public employment relations are in a state of rapid development, several
newspaper articles are cited in the introductory and strike sections of this
article.
Throughout this article public sector means state and local governmen-
tal employers and employees. Local governmental employers include coun-
ties, cities, school districts, and special districts. When the term private
sector is used, it refers to nongovernmental employers and employees.
2. Hoover, Police, Firemen, Doctors: Self-Interest Erases Image of Folk
Hero, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
3. E.g., Cebulski, Some Recent Trends in Local Government Agreements,
26 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE RELATroNs 52, 53 (Sept. 1975) [This excellent publi-
cation of the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California,
Berkeley, is hereinafter cited as C.P.E.R.]. Cebulski notes that inflation
may influence the trend in public employee agreements to include cost-of-
living escalator clauses and staggered wage increase provisions.
4. Benoit, Inflation-Unemployment Tradeoff and Full Recovery, 34
AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. 337, 338 (Oct. 1975). In September 1975, employees
spent $177.80 to purchase the same quality and quantity of food items which
could have been purchased for $100.00 in 1967. UNiTED STATEs CouiNc
OF ECONoMIc ADVISERS, Ecoxoimic INDICATORs 26 (Oct. 1975). During the
period from September 1974, to September 1975, the consumer price index
increased 11.9 per cent. Id. at 26. Over the ten-year period between 1965
and 1974, the consumer price index for all items increased from 94.5 to 147.7.
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mid-1970's recession, which has been described as the worst since
World War H,5 approximately 95,000 state and local governmental
workers had jobs that paid less than the minimum wage of $1.90
per hour.6 Traditional economic theories of supply and demand
have shed little light on the problem of spiraling consumer prices
and unemployment. 7
Since 1935, employees in the private sector have been able to press
their economic demands on the basis, at least in part, of two rights
under the original National Labor Relations Act and the subsequent
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) .8 Private sector em-
ployees have the rights to bargain collectively and to engage in
other concerted activities for mutual protection.9 The courts have
construed the right to engage in concerted activities legislation as
including the right to strike.10
Federal, state, and local governmental employees are expressly
excluded from coverage under the LMRA." Thus public employees
lack federal protection of the rights to collective bargaining and to
BuREAu or THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
oF THE 'UNiTED STATES 1975, at 422 (96th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
STAT. ABSTRACT]. Over the ten-year period between 1965 and 1974, the
median money income of all families increased from $6,957.00 to $12,836.00.
Id. at 390.
5. L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1975, § III, at 19, col. 6.
6. J. FORSHAM, LOCAL GOVE ixrrT LAw 345 (rev. ed. 1975).
7. See generally Benoit, Inflation-Unemployment Tradeoff and Full
Recovery, 34 Am. J. EcoN. & Soc. 337-344 (Oct. 1975). See also Means,
Simultaneous Inflation and Unemployment: A Challenge to Theory and
Policy, CHLLENGE 6-20 (Sept./Oct. 1975). In September 1975, 7,522,000
people, or 8.1 per cent of the total United States labor force, were unem-
ployed. EcoN. INDICATORS, supra note 4, at 10. During the period be-
tween January and September 1975, no less than eight per cent of the labor
force was unemployed. Id.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
9. Id. In 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), collective bargaining is defined,
in part, as:
[T]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested
by either party .... (emphasis added).
10. See Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 689, 355 P.2d 905, 907, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1960).
In Met. Transit, the California Supreme Court held, in part: "Terms such
as 'concerted activities' are commonly used by the courts as well as legis-
lative bodies to refer to strikes." California transit workers are unique
among California's public employees because the Legislature has expressly
granted the transit workers the right to engage in concerted activities. Id.
at 689, 355 P.2d at 907, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2)-(3) (1970).
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strike in pressing their economic demands. The effect of the LVIRA
public employee exclusion has been characterized by one observer
in the following terms:
Inconsistency and confusion best describe the legal setting of
labor relations for state and local government employees. Each of
the 50 states and the 80,000 units of local government does its own
thing. There is no set pattern. The labor programs are regulated
by state laws, city ordinances, court decisions, attorneys general
opinions, county charters, civil service rules, executive orders,
school board policies, and other regulations.12
The plethora of public employee laws directly affects a relatively
high number of employees and employers. In 1970, state and local
governments employed ten million people, or 11.6 per cent of the
labor force.' 3 Sixty per cent of new jobs are positions created by
state and local governments. 14 In October 1974, California and its
more than 2,600 local units'5 employed 263,000 state workers and
987,000 local governmental workers.' 6 This public sector growth has
been accompanied by upsurges in public employee union member-
ships and union organizational endeavors.' 7 For example, the
12. Statement of Jerry Wurf, President of the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, Hearings
on H.R. 7684, H.R. 9324, and H.R. 12532 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 28 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Cong. Hearings]. For an analysis
of the details of the three bills which would either amend the NLRA to
include public employee-employer relations or establish a separate national
law, see 1972 Cong. Hearings 22 et seq. For one example of a position
against federal intervention in public employee relations, see the position
statement of the National League of Cities in 1972 Cong. Hearings 200 et
seq. See also Cebulski, Proposed Federal Laws Governing State and Local
Public Employee Relations, 23 C.P.E.R. 17 (Dec. 1974).
13. 1972 Cong. Hearings 26.
14. Id.
15. CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL No. 275, at 7




School & Community College Districts 1,100
Independent Special Districts 1,102
TOTAL 2,671
16. 1975 STAT. ABSTRACT 273. The figures in the text are reduced to a
total of 1,017,000 California public employees if only full-time equivalent
employment is considered.
17. See 1972 Cong. Hearings 213-41 for detailed statistical trends re-
garding municipal employee organizations. See also 1975 STAT. ABsTRACT
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) increased its membership from 5,000 in 1935, to 525,000
in 1972,18 and to 750,000 in 1976.19 Furthermore, the AFL-CIO esti-
mates its 2.4 million federal, state, and local public employee mem-
bership may double between 1975 and 1977.20
Many public employers are faced with a complex question: How
can governmental units cope with spiraling inflation, the public em-
ployees' demands for increased compensation, and the taxpayers'
demands for efficient services without increasing tax burdens?21
The cost of public employees' pay and benefits is ordinarily the larg-
est expense in a governmental budget.22 For example, in the 1975-
76 fiscal year, Los Angeles budgeted $180 million for police services
and $77 million for fire protection.23 When payroll costs amount
to tens of millions of dollars, employers are reluctant to agree to
annual ten to fifteen per cent pay increases. In California most new
pay increases must be passed on directly to the taxpayer, for deficit
spending is unconstitutional unless two-thirds of the governmental
unit's voters decide otherwise.24
373 for data regarding private sector union membership. Because 27.2 per
cent of all nonagricultural employees belonged to unions in 1972, it is evi-
dent that most members of the labor force are not union members.
18. 1972 Cong. Hearings 26.
19. San Diego Evening Tribune, June 14, 1976, at A-7, col. 2.
20. Id. Unions expend large amounts of money in the organizational ef-
forts of public employees. For example, the California Federation of Teach-
ers announced in October 1975, that it would spend $5 million in an effort
to become the exclusive bargaining representative for the state's 100,000
teachers. See San Diego Evening Tribune, October 17, 1975, at B-1, col. 2.
See table in text accompanying note 79 infra.
21. See generally American Cities: The Need for a New Politics, TuE
ECONOmST 21-34 (Oct. 1975); Broder, The Reality Behind the Ruin Facing
Our Cities, L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1975, § II, at 7, col. 1; Pierce, Bigness Worsens
City Woes, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1975, § VII, at 3, col. 1.
22. See, e.g., INTERnV HEARING BEFoRE THm CAL. Ass. Covm. ONq Erv.-
PLOYMENT AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, WORK STOPPAGES IN PUBLIC JURISDIc-
TIoNS 51 (Sept. 13, 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 CAL. HEAmG]; Gerald
Davis, City Manager, Vallejo, Cal., testified that employee salaries and
benefits amount to seventy per cent of a city's budget.
In October 1974, the monthly payroll was $805 million for California's
state and local employees in six areas: education, hospitals, highways, po-
lice and fire protection, and public welfare. 1975 STAT. ABSTRACT 274.
In the 1975 San Francisco mayoral election, city spending for public
employee pay increases became a major issue; immediately before the
November 1975, election, San Francisco home owners received an aver-
age forty-five per cent increase in assessed valuations. L.A. Times, Oct.
28, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 4. In January 1976, bus drivers in San Diego threat-
ened to strike, but the walkout was averted when the drivers accepted a
new three-year contract under which their annual income will be increased
from the current level of $18,932 to $21,874. San Diego Evening Tribune,
Jan. 14, 1976, at A-1, cols. 3-4.
23. San Diego Evening Tribune, Aug. 27, 1975, at B-9, col. 1.
24. CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 18.
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It is unlikely public employers would deliberately emulate New
York's desperate measures in 1975 to stave off default. Public em-
ployers outside New York might not soon forget the specter of a
public employer firing thousands of public employees, asking other
public employees to accept lower benefits than they have already
won, and borrowing from employees' pension funds to meet the
monthly payroll.25 Although taxpayers may demand and employ-
ers may attempt to create austerity budgets, most observers foresee
the continued growth of public employee unionization and the con-
comitant economic demands for increased pay.2 6
These introductory comments provide a foundation for this ar-
ticle, which encompasses three topics: First, governmental services
are increasingly interrupted by public employee strikes; second, dif-
ferent statutory devices are evolving for negotiation and resolution
of public employee disputes; and third, at least four provoking fea-
tures are emerging from the different statutory approaches. Al-
though the focus of the article is upon California legislation, most
of the remarks may be relevant elsewhere. Indeed, California is not
alone in its current efforts to design vehicles for amicable public
employment relations.
PROBLEM: BURGEONING DISRUPTION OF STATE AmD LOCAL
SERvIcEs BECAUSE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES
Although some jurisdictions permit limited strikes by public em-
ployees unless public health, safety, or welfare is endangered, 27
most jurisdictions either prohibit or do not authorize public em-
ployee strikes.28 Nevertheless, in efforts to obtain higher compen-
sation, sole reliance on the merit system has been recently re-
jected.2 9 Despite widespread prohibition, public employees often do
strike.30
25. See L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1975, § IX, at 3, col. 4, and L.A. Times, Oct.
19, 1975, § I, at 1, col. 5.
26. See Raskin, Nonunion Workers Are An Expanding Majority, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 2, 1975, § 4, at 5, col. 1; Raskin states that one exception to
the increasing number of nonunion workers is in the area of "spectacular"
union growth among public employees.
27. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101 to 1101.2301 (Supp. 1976-
77); § 1101.401 is the general employee rights section.
28. Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 79 YALE L. J. 805, 825 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Wellington
& Winter].
29. J. FoRDHAm, LocAL GOVERNMENTAL LAW 338 (rev. ed. 1975).
30. Id. at 338-95. See also Burton and Krider, The Role and Conse-
When tens of thousands of governmental workers engage in hun-
dreds of strikes31 for more than one million work-days idle in each
of recent years, it becomes altogether clear that many public em-
ployees have resorted to the strike.3 2 At a 1975 AFL-CIO confer-
ence, the president of the AFSCME commented that his union has
a strike in some part of the country just about every day and that
"most of the strikes are illegal."33 The concomitant disruption of
governmental services has been a widespread consequence of public
sector strikes.
In California, except for certain groups of transit workers who
have legislative authorization to engage in concerted activities, the
Legislature has not authorized public employee strikes.3 4 However,
except for firemen, the Legislature has not expressly prohibited
public employee strikes.35 California courts have noted that, in
the absence of legislative authorization, public employees in general
do not have the right to strike.36 Nevertheless, the California Su-
quences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Jascourt,
Public Sector Labor Relations in 1974, 26 LAB. L.J. 312 (May 1975).
31. See San Diego Evening Tribune, Sept. 25, 1975, at A-11, col. 3 (New
Jersey police); L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1975, § I, at 2, col. 3 (Oklahoma police);
L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § I, at 11, col 1 (Kansas City firemen strike);
San Diego Evening Tribune, Sept. 4, 1975 at A-i, col. 3 (multi-state teacher
strikes); San Diego Evening Tribune, Oct. 28, 1975, at A-4, col. 1 (Illinois
doctors' strike). When the policemen attempted to extinguish the fires dur-
ing the Kansas City firemen strike, the police discovered that some of the
fire equipment had been sabotaged. Fire extinguishers had been filled with
flammable liquids; water had been poured into fire engine gasoline tanks.
L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § I, at 11, col. 1.
32. 1975 STAT. ABSTRACT 374. In 1973, 196,000 federal, state, and local
governmental employees began 386 work stoppages (strikes, slow-downs,
boycotts) resulting in 2,299,000 work-days idle during the year.
33. L.A. Times, Oct. 8, 1975, § II, at 2, col. 5.
34. See generally Los Angeles Metro. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960).
35. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1962 (West 1971). The Legislature has indirectly
precluded strikes by other public employees, except for certain transit
workers. In CAL. LABOR CODE § 923 (West 1971), the Legislature grants em-
ployees the rights to bargain collectively and to engage in other concerted
activities for mutual protection. However, CAL. LABOR CODE § 1963 (West
1971) makes § 923 inapplicable to firemen. Likewise, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3509
(West Supp. 1976) makes § 923 inapplicable to local public employees. Sim-
ilarly, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3536 (West Supp. 1976) makes § 923 inapplicable to
state public employees. Thus most public employees in California do not
have § 923 rights. For two landmark decisions regarding § 923, compare Petri
Cleaners, Inc. v. Local 88, Automotive Employees, 53 Cal. 2d 455, 2 P.2d
76, 2 Cal Rptr. 470 (1960), with Messner v. Journeymen Barbers, Interna-
tional Union, 53 Cal. 2d 873, 351 P.2d 347, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960).
36. See Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960); Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. v. United Teachers, 24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 100 Cal. Rptr.
806 (1972); City of San Diego v. American Fed'n of State, County and
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preme Court has recently held "[i] n the absence of applicable con-
stitutional, legislative, or charter proscriptions, a duly enacted legis-
lative measure cannot be invalidated on the ground it was enacted
as a result of an illegal strike.' s t The legality of most strikes by
California public employees is uncertain. The debatable illegality
of the strikes, however, does not preclude the legality of the settle-
ments and ordinances drafted pursuant to the strike. In short, un-
authorized strikes can result in legal post-strike agreements.
Notwithstanding the lack of authorization to strike, California
public employees do strike to press their economic and noneconomic
demands.38 Policemen, firemen, and teachers, among others, have
resorted to unauthorized strikes. One recent example of a major
California strike is the three-day walkout in 1975 by 3,700 San Fran-
cisco firemen and policemen; the employee organizations demanded
Municipal Employees, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1970); Almond
v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969).
37. City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 911, 534
P.2d 403, 411, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707, 715 (1975). In Cooper the court briefly
focused upon the issue of public employee strike legality. The court
observed:
In characterizing the employee work stoppage at issue as "illegal,"
the taxpayer relies on a series of Court of Appeal decisions which
have concluded that under the present state of California law pub-
lic employees do not have the right to strike. The return filed by
the various real party in interest employee associations contests this
conclusion, arguing . . . that present state statutes implicitly au-
thorize strikes by some categories of public employees .... (cita-
tions omitted). Id. at 912, 534 P.2d at 411-12, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
715-16.
In Cooper, the court also noted:
The only general state statute which specifically speaks to the pub-
lic employee strike issue is Labor Code section 1962, which pro-
hibits strikes by firefighters. The employee associations argue that
the absence of a similar statutory prohibition of other public em-
ployee strikes represents an implicit authorization of such action.
Id. at 912 n.5, 534 P.2d at 412 n.5, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 716 n.5.
After delineating these contrasting views, the court concluded: "We have
no occasion to resolve this controversy in the present action . . . ." Id. at
912, 534 P.2d at 412, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 716. The court also referred to the
public employee strike as merely "an allegedly illegal strike." Id. at 918,
534 P.2d at 416, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 720. Thus the court left the door open
for further consideration regarding the characterization of public employee
strikes as "illegal."
38. See 1972 Cong. Hearings 94; Cebulski, An Analysis of 22 Illegal
Strikes and California Law, 18 C.P.E.R. 2 (Aug. 1973); and Cebulski &
Stern, A Five-Year Study of California Public Employee Strikes, 25 C.P.E.R.
2 (June 1975) [hereinafter cited as Cal. Strikes].
and the mayor acceded to a thirteen per cent pay increase. 9 Ad-
mittedly frustrated by the upsurge in the cost of living, the em-
ployees cast aside any notions of the "public servant mystique." 40
In the course of the strike, the police aroused fear by announcing
that the streets were no longer safe.41 Moreover, because most of
the police carried their service revolvers while they picketed during
the strike, the police aroused the fear of elected officials that "in-
ternecine warfare142 could erupt if the California National Guard
or Highway Patrol were called into service. The police chief said
he was "ashamed" that striking policemen had vandalized seventeen
police cars during the strike.43 Final settlement included a "no re-
prisal" clause.4 4
Another illustration of public employee strikes is the Berkeley,
California, firemen's strike in September 1975. The firemen de-
manded a 16.5 per cent pay increase. The city offered an eight per
cent increase in 1975 and a seven per cent increase in 1976. When
the firemen offered to submit the dispute to binding arbitration,
the city refused because arbitrators "by nature, are compromis-
ers." 45 After a strike of twenty-four days, settlement was reached
on a sixteen per cent increase over two years. 40
39. N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1975, at 38, col. 6.
40. Hoover, Police, Firemen, Doctors: Self-Interest Erases Image of Folk
Hero, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
41. Rempel, Police Use Powerful Weapon, L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 1975, §
VI, at 6, col. 5.
42. Childs, The Grim Precedent of Police Strike, San Diego Evening
Tribune, Aug. 27, 1975, at B-2, col. 5.
For a different perspective of the divided loyalties of policemen in unions,
see Goodman & Endicott, Alaska Today-Runaway Crime and Union Vio-
lence, L.A. Times, Nov. 18, 1975, § I, at 1, col. 1. Alaskan officials have re-
ported extraordinary rises in crime during construction of the Alaskan pipe-
line. Some officials have alleged that many policemen in Alaska ignore
the crimes of union construction workers. Alaskan Governor Jay S. Ham-
mond recently said: "Anchorage police are Teamsters first and police sec-
ond-and that's a shame." Id. at 19, col. 4.
43. San Diego Evening Tribune, Aug. 28, 1975, at A-3, col. 2. See Recent
Developments in California Public Jurisdictions, 26 C.P.E.R. 57, 68 (Sept.
1975); this reference includes an example of a union's agreement to reim-
burse the county for vandalism against county property during a strike.
44. N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1975, at 38, col. 6. See generally Hilligan, Police
Employee Organizations: Past Developments and Present Problems, 24
LAB. L.J. 288 (1973). In the immediate aftermath of the San Francisco po-
lice strike, Pomona, Cal. police received a fifteen per cent pay increase by
the mere threat of a police strike. San Diego Evening Tribune, Aug.
29, 1975, at A-1, col. 1. Other public employers may view the relatively
extreme tactics used in the San Francisco police strike as a precedent which
compels the officials to succumb to police demands.
45. San Diego Evening Tribune, Aug. 27, 1975, at A-1, col. 5.
46. L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1975, § I, at 2, col. 5. See also 1972 Cong. Hear-
ings 89-94; and Recent Developments, supra note 43, at 94. The C.P.E.R.
article indicates the International Ass'n of Fire Fighters (IAFF), AFL-CIO,
[VOL. 13: 931, 1976] Comments
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The Berkeley teachers' strike in September 1975, is a third, al-
though different, example of California employees' resort to the
strike. In April 1975, the school board and teachers negotiated an
agreement that salaries and benefits would continue at existing lev-
els; there was to be neither an increase nor decrease in compensa-
tion rates. When the school district found unexpected deficits dur-
ing the summer of 1975, the board decided to reduce the teachers'
salaries and benefits.47 An ensuing strike, which lasted thirty-two
days, was terminated when the parties agreed to submit the dis-
putes to a fact-finding panel for recommendation.48 The school
board and teachers submitted several proposals to the panel. The
panel eventually recommended and the board agreed to restore the
April rates of salaries.49
A significant and growing minority of public employees have
turned to and participated in strikes. For example, between Janu-
ary 1970, and December 1974, there were 115 unauthorized public
employee strikes in California.50 Forty-three of the disruptions oc-
curred in 1974.51 Furthermore, the 115 California strikes involved
more than 74,000 employees and resulted in more than one million
work-idle days.52 The California tide of such strikes continues to
roll in; there were fifty unauthorized walkouts between January
and October 1975. 53
Generally, states authorize use of the injunction for prohibition
of strikes in the public sector.54 In a recent opinion, the California
Supreme Court "assumed" public employee strikes "may properly
represented 19,000 California firemen in September 1975. In 1974, there
were 85,300 state and local police and firemen in California. 1975 STAT. AB-
STRACT 274.
47. San Diego Evening Tribune, Sept. 3, 1975, at A-4, col. 1.
48. L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1975, § I, at 23, col. 3. See also The San Francisco
Municipal and Teachers Strikes of March 1974, 21 C.P.E.R. 21 (June 1974);
the article includes a summary of events, litigation, and settlements of two
strikes. See also Alderfer, Follow-up on the Pennsylvania School Strikes,
25 LAB. L.J. 161 (1974).
49. Cebulski & Bowen, Two Case Studies-Facts and Issues, 27 C.P.E.R.
19, 28 (Dec. 1975). The fact-finding panel did not make all the recommen-
dations requested by the teachers.
50. Cal. Strikes 4. See also 22 Illegal Strikes, supra note 38, at 2-17.
51. Cal. Strikes 4.
52. Id.
53. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1975, § II, at 6, col. 1.
54. See Wellington & Winter. 825, 839-42.
be enjoined under a court's equity power ... or may subject strik-
ing employees to a variety of administrative sanctions including dis-
missal .... 55 The California court, however, disfavors imposition
of mandatory, harsh statutory sanctions against striking public em-
ployees. The court observes that "draconian," automatic sanctions
tend to prolong rather than to prevent work stoppages. 0
A 1972 study of twenty-two California strikes revealed temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions have little effect on
the termination of the strike; moreover, enforcement by contempt
citations or arrest is indeed seldom.57 Court orders neither shorten
nor end most public employee strikes in California. 8 Employers
rarely take punitive measures against strikers, and the overwhelm-
ing majority of settlements include no reprisal clauses. 9 In short,
neither judicial sanctions nor employer sanctions ordinarily impede
the disruption of governmental services by striking employees.
Public response to the burgeoning disruption of governmental
services has varied throughout the state. A public opinion poll of
Los Angeles and Orange County residents revealed forty-nine per
cent thought policemen should not have the right to strike, forty-
one per cent thought policemen should have the right, and ten per
cent did not know.60 Similar percentages resulted when those in-
terviewed were asked whether firemen should have such a right.
Thus Los Angeles and Orange County residents were almost evenly
split in their responses on the rights of public safety workers to
strike.
The public response to the 1975 San Francisco police and firemen
strike was intense. For example, San Francisco voters overwhelm-
ingly passed three propositions adversely affecting the future bene-
fits of policemen and firemen.61 The voters approved another prop-
55. City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 912, 534
P.2d 403, 412, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707, 716 (1975) (citations omitted). The court
observed neither the California Constitution nor the Legislature prescribes
mandatory sanctions for striking public employees. Id.
56. Id. at 917, 534 P.2d at 415, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
57. 22 Illegal Strikes, supra note 38, at 6-7; Cal. Strikes 5. See also
Gould, Civil or Criminal Contempt-the Problem of Contempt Proceedingsfor Striking Teachers, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 269 (1974).
58. Cal. Strikes 5.
59. Id. For an illustration of the significance of the no reprisal clause
in strike settlements, see Recent Developments, supra note 43, at 86. For
an example of the "conditions of amnesty" provisions, see id. at 67.
60. L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1975, § 1, at 27, col. 1. See also Oestreich &
Zidnak, Attitudes Toward Bargaining and Strikes in Public Employment:
A Survey, 23 C.P.E.R. 46 (Dec. 1974).
61. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1975, § I, at 3, col. 5, and § II, at 6, col. 1.
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osition reducing the formula for determining pay increases for 5,600
other public employees.62  In the aftermath of the San Francisco
strike, the governor said the settlement set a "dangerous precedent"
because it allowed the strikers "to get their way through illegality
and brute force."63
What are the alternatives, if any, to the increasing disruption of
governmental services by striking employees who seek to press their
economic demands? One commentator has suggested two innova-
tive strike alternatives: In a "nonstoppage" strike, until impasses
are resolved, employees continue working while both employers and
employees irretrievably lose certain monies to a trust fund for the
public; in a "graduated" strike, employees might walk out on Mon-
days for a month, then Mondays and Thursdays for a month, and
so forth to gradually build up the pressures for settlement.6 4 The
California Legislative Analyst has suggested that one bargaining
alternative might be the "automatic increase" whereby compensa-
tion increases are adjusted in accordance with predetermined for-
mulas.6 5 The California Legislature has not enacted these alterna-
tives to public sector strikes. Nevertheless, as discussed in the fol-
lowing section, there are two areas in which the Legislature is re-
sponding in an effort to alleviate the burgeoning disruption of gov-
ernmental services due to unauthorized public employee strikes.
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO DISRUPTIVE PUBLIc EMPLOYEE
STRKEs: AN AssonTmET OF EmERGING MEASURES FOR
NEGOTIATION AND RESOLUTION OF INTEREST DIsPUTES
California policies and procedures for determining public em-
ployee compensation and establishing personnel management prac-
tices have changed significantly in recent years.6 6 Partially in re-
62. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1975, § I, at 1, cols. 1-2.
63. Bernstein, Arbitration Could Cap Those Walkouts, L.A. Times, Aug.
31, 1975, § VI, at 1, col. 1.
64. Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85
HIARv. L. Rzv. 459, 470-75 (1971). See generally Wellington & Winter 822-
52.
65. CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, COLLECTIVE BARGAINIG IN CALIFORNIA Pu3-
Lic JURISDiCTIONS, ALTEmATnVS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
21-23 (Feb. 27, 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 CAL. LEGIS. A-NALYST].
66. Id. at 1. See also Blair, State Legislative Control over the Conditions
of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of Collective Bargaining for
State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1973). Blair's
sponse to disruptive public employee strikes, the Legislature has
enacted an assortment of measures for negotiation of economic de-
mands and resolution of impasses over interest disputes. An inter-
est dispute is a controversy about proposed terms of an employer-
employee agreement.67 This should be contrasted to a rights dis-
pute, which is a controversy over interpretation or execution of the
existing terms of an employer-employee agreement.0 s When the
parties to an interest dispute reach a point in negotiations at which
their differences are so substantial that future meetings are tempo-
rarily futile, an impasse has been reached.69
As of July 1, 1976, three main statutes address public employ-
ment. The Meyers-Milias-Brown-Act (VIMBA) 70 applies to em-
ployer-employee relations among local governmental units. For ex-
ample, the MMBA covers local public safety workers such as police-
men and firemen.71 The George Brown Act 72 concerns employees
of state agencies, colleges, and universities. The Public Educational
Employment Relations Act (PEERA) 73 applies to approximately
450,000 employees of local school districts and community colleges.
PEERA became fully operative on July 1, 1976, repealing the Win-
ton Act,74 which did not provide for collective bargaining for teach-
ers.
survey of public employee statutes among the states indicates recent
changes and diversity are not unique to California legislation.
67. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PUBLIc EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT
177-94 (March 15, 1973) [hereinafter cited as the 1973 ADv. COUN. REPORT].
68. Id. at 194-240.
See 1972 Cong. Hearings 24; apparently more than ninety per cent of dis-
agreements over terms of existing agreements do not end in public em-
ployee strikes.
What are typical issues in a labor dispute? See Hoffnan, Resolving
Labor-Management Disputes: A Nine-Country Comparison, 29 ARE. J. 185
(1974). Hoffman suggests:
The major types of disputes are economic-those aimed at deter-
mining wages, hours, and other conditions of employment; and
noneconomic-those concerning the interpretation of a collective
agreement, union jurisdiction, union recognition, and sometimes
political decisions made by the state.
69. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3540.1 (f) (West Supp. 1976).
70. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-11 (West Supp. 1976). MMBA was enacted
in 1961 and amended in 1965, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972. MMBA ap-
plies to local transit workers whose rights to collective bargaining and con-
certed activities are covered by separate statutes. See, e.g., CAL. PuB. UTIL,
CODE § 30750 et seq. (West 1973); these sections were adopted in 1964 and
apply to employees of the Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.
71. See also CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1960-63 (West 1971); these sections
and MVIBA apply to firemen.
72. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3525-36 (West Supp. 1976); these sections were
enacted in 1971 and have not been amended to date.
73. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3540-49 (West Supp. 1976).
74. Id. The Winton Act was effective until July 1, 1976.
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The MMBA, George Brown Act, and Winton Act have received
mounting criticism in recent years because they lack sufficient
means to promote the resolution of impasses.7 5 Additionally,
"[s]upport for [comprehensive governmental employee collective
bargaining measures] is growing among members of the Legisla-
ture, and the Governor has stated his support for collective bar-
gaining for state employees."76 Public employee organizations and
labor unions in California have registered strong support for col-
lective bargaining legislation to cover all state and local public em-
ployees. 7
Despite recommendations both for the repeal of the multiple stat-
utes and for the enactment of a single, comprehensive law, the Cal-
ifornia Legislature has failed to enact several bills which would
have heeded such advice.7 8 During the 1975-76 Regular Session,
the Legislature did not pass Senate Bill (SB) 275, which would have
provided collective bargaining and extended impasse resolution de-
vices for nearly all public employees. However, the Legislature did
75. See generally 1972 Cong. Hearings 67-69; 1974 CAL. HEARINGS 54 et
seq., 90 et seq., and 100 et seq.; 1973 ADv. CouN. REPORT 28-29; evaluation
by Leo Geffner, in Proceedings-The Meyers-Milias-Brown and Winton
Acts: Major Legal Issues 32-39 (Institute of Industrial Relations, Univ. of
Cal., Berkeley, Jan. 12, 1974).
76. 1975 CAL. LEGIs. ANALYST 1. Commentators have extensively ex-
amined public sector collective bargaining. See generally Blair, supra
note 66, at 1 et seq.; Feller, General Theory of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663-856 (1973); Comment, Negotiating with the
Public: Montana's Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act, 36 MONT.
L. REV. 80-92 (1975); Shaw & Clark, The Practical Differences Between
Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 867-
86 (1972); Schmidman, Collective Bargaining in Pennsylvania Public
Sector: The First Three Months, 24 LAB. L.J. 755-63 (1973); Summers,
Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156-
1200 (1974); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107-27 (1969); Wellington & Winter 805-
70.
77. See, e.g., 1974 CAL. HEARiNG 54 et seq., 90 et seq., and 100 et seq.
78. See 1973 ADv. CouN. REPORT 29-34, and 1-35 of appendix A.
For a comparative analysis of the provisions of six Senate bills and four
Assembly bills which would have implemented collective bargaining in the
Legislature, see 1975 CAL. LEGIs. ANALYST 11-13. Most of the 1973-74 bills
established a board to administer the act, specified unfair labor practices,
and provided for exclusive representation. The bills differed as to nego-
tiable items, bargaining unit criteria, and authorization of strikes. Many
of the bills were patterned after the LMRA and the model legislation rec-
ommended in the 1973 Av. CouN. REPORT 1-35 of appendix A; see 1975
CAL. LEGIs. ANALYST 10, 14.
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enact Senate Bill (SB) 160 (PEERA), which provides statutory
measures for collective bargaining and expanded impasse resolution
devices for public education employees. 79
79. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MAJOR PROVISIONS IN TWO
SENATE BILLS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONSIDERED DURING
THE 1975-76 SESSION OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE:
Defeated SB 275* Enacted SB 160
Provisions (DILLS) (RODDA)
Title: Collective Bargaining Public Educational
Act for Public Employer-Employee




































Wages, hours, and other





















January 1 to July 1,
1976
*On June 17, 1975 SB 275 was incorporated by amendment into SB 4. The
SB 275 provisions in this table are drawn from the version of the bill as it
was introduced on Jan. 23, 1975; the SB 160 provisions are in accordance
with the version as enacted on Sept. 22, 1975.
For further discussion on SB 275, see Legislation: SB 275 and Practitioner
Reaction, 24 C.P.E.R. 72 (March 1975).
SB 275 closely followed the terms of the recommended "model legisla-
tion" in the 1973 Anv. CouN. REPORT 1-35 of appendix A. Hereinafter, SB
275 is mentioned as one illustration of recent defeat of the recommended
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Hypothesizing the city of Sealand, California, may help illustrate
certain concepts and observations. Sealand is a coastal city of
200,000 people. It employs 250 policemen and 250 firemen. The
public school districts and Sealand Community College employ six-
hundred teachers and other educational employees. In addition, 150
employees of the University of California, Sealand, and other state
departments provide state services in Sealand. As we turn to the
assortment of negotiation vehicles and impasse resolution devices
which the Legislature has enacted, we shall again consider Sealand.
Evolving Statutory Vehicles for Negotiation
Under the principal California public sector statutes, different ve-
hicles are available for negotiation of the employees' demands for
increased pay and benefits. The MiVIBA provides that local public
employment discussions shall take the form of conferences: Parties
must "meet and confer" in good faith regarding wages and other
terms and conditions of employment.80 Employers are required to
consider the employees' proposals before the employer determines
the final decision.8 ' Moreover, the parties must endeavor to reach
agreement on subjects within the scope of representation. 2 If the
representatives of the parties reach an agreement, its terms are re-
duced to a nonbinding memorandum of understanding that is pre-
sented to the governing local board for final determination.8 3
In the hypothetical city of Sealand, however, the five-hundred
public safety workers have proposed a twelve per cent pay increase
so they can keep apace with the twelve per cent increase in the
consumer price index. The city manager, under pressures from the
comprehensive approach. Also, all references to SB 275 are to its intro-
ductory version as of Jan. 23, 1975.
80. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1976). See Blair, supra note 66,
at 3-5; Blair observed that twenty-three states, including California, defined
their discussion vehicles and scope of bargaining in terms of the LMRA.
81. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1976).
82. Id.
83. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505.1 (West Supp. 1976). See Grodin, Public Em-
ployee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the
Courts, 23 HAST. L.J. 719 (1972).
The most notable qualities of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act is its
sketchiness and its vagueness. It does not say very much about
the critical issues which confront labor-management relations in
the public sector, and what it does say it says with confusing lack
of clarity. Id. at 760.
council to agree to no more than a 3.5 per cent increase, and the
public safety workers have been unsuccessful in their endeavor to
reach agreement. Consequently, no memorandum of understanding
has been drafted. Sealand and its local employees are stalemated.
What is the negotiation vehicle for state employees? Under the
George Brown Act, the representatives of the parties are required
simply to meet and confer. Employers are required merely to fully
consider the employees' proposals.s4 State employees residing and
working in Sealand also demanded a twelve per cent pay increase.
Unlike the IVIMBA for local employees, the George Brown Act, cov-
ering state employees, does not require parties either to endeavor
to reach agreement or to negotiate in good faith.59 When the Leg-
islative Analyst recently delineated the procedures and parties in-
volved in determining the compensation for state employees, the
state employees were not listed as a party, and the "meet and con-
fer" conferences were not listed as part of the process.80
What is the vehicle for negotiation under the newly enacted
PEERA? The Legislature provided that public educational discus-
sion shall be conducted through "meeting and negotiating. ' s  In
defining the vehicle, the Legislature incorporated language from
the MMBA18s and the LMRA.89 Although PEERA does not ex-
pressly use the term collective bargaining, one could assume the
term meeting and negotiating probably is its functional equivalent.
However, PEERA may prove to be somewhat ambiguous on col-
lective bargaining because PEERA makes section 923 of the Cali-
fornia Labor Code inapplicable. Section 923 grants employees the
rights to collective bargaining and to strike.90
84. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3530 (West Supp. 1976).
85. Grodin, supra note 83, at 721. In his discussion of the differences
among California's public sector statutes, Grodin suggests:
This statutory melange produces curious results. Many of the
statutory distinctions appear to be the product of ad hoe political
compromises, unsupported by any national policy. Id.
86. 1975 CAL. LEGIs. ANALYST 17-19.
87. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3540.1(h) (West Supp. 1976) provides:
"Meeting and negotiating" means meeting, conferring, negotiating,
and discussing by the exclusive representative and the public
school employer in a good faith effort to reach agreement on mat-
ters within the scope of representation and the execution, if re-
quested by either party, of a written document incorporating any
agreements reached, which document shall, when accepted by the
exclusive representative and the public school employer, become
binding upon both parties and, notwithstanding Section 3543.7,
shall not be subject to subdivision 2 of Section 1667 of the Civil
Code. The agreement may be for a period of not to exceed three
years. Id.
88. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1976).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
90. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3549 (West Supp. 1976); see note 35 supra.
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Under PEERA, the exclusive representative of the Sealand educa-
tional employees would meet and negotiate in a good faith effort
to reach an agreement on the issues of a twelve per cent pay in-
creasef 1 If an agreement is reached, its terms would be reduced
to a written document. The document becomes binding on the Sea-
land school district and employees when the terms are accepted by
both parties.
We should perhaps take a moment to explore the negotiation ve-
hicle included in recently considered but defeated comprehensive
bills such as Senate Bill (SB) 275. SB 275 included a provision
which was straightforwardly labeled "collective bargaining." 92
Collective bargaining under SB 275 was defined in terms similar
to the Legislature's PEERA definition of meeting and negotiating.
Under California's MMBA, PEERA, and SB 275, the three respec-
tive discussion vehicles of meeting and conferring, meeting and ne-
gotiating, and collective bargaining have emerged with practically
the same statutory definitions.
The end product of the negotiation vehicles somewhat varies:
Under MMBA, negotiations may result in a nonbinding memoran-
dum of understanding; under PEERA, negotiations may end in a
binding written document; under SB 275, negotiations may result
in a binding written contract.
Evolving Statutory Impasse Resolution Measures
Thus far we have seen economic conditions were a factor in the
upsurge of public employee unionization and resort to the usually
unauthorized strike. Also, the disrupted governmental services and
employee demands apparently influenced the Legislature to evolve
different vehicles for discussion of interest disputes. Additionally,
the Legislature has enacted and considered various measures for
the resolution of impasses.
91. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540.1(h) (West Supp. 1976).
92. SB 275, 1975-76 Cal. Legislature, Reg. Sess. (1975); when the bill was
introduced on Jan. 23, 1975, it proposed that CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3501 provide
as follows:
Collective bargaining means discussing and negotiating in good
faith in an effort to reach mutual understandings in respect to all
matters within the scope of bargaining, and executing a written
contract, if requested by either party, incorporating any and all
such understandings so reached, provided that such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or to make a conces-
sion. Id.
The following chart is designed to illustrate certain distinctions
among legislative provisions for impasse resolutions.
Comparative Analysis of Emerging Impasse Resolution
Devices Under Enacted & Defeated California Legislation
Enacted, Proposed, and Unauthorized
Impasse Resolution Devices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cal. Statute ." o.uor Bill Scope cu 0. a,
Meyers-Milias- Public safety
Brown Act & other local(MMBA) employees X x
George Brown
Act State(GBA) employees x
Pub. Educ. Emp't
Relations Act Public educ.(PEERA) employees X X x
Pub. Emp't
Relations Bill State and(Defeated local
SB 275) employees X X X X
The remainder of this section will summarize the distinctions
among the different measures on the chart. This table has been
included for two reasons: First, there is a wide array of recognized
impasse resolution mechanisms which have not been enacted in Cal-
ifornia or in most other states; second, since July 1, 1976, while
450,000 employees have two statutory devices available for resolving
impasses without resorting to strikes, 750,000 employees have one
or no statutory device available.
Most of the enacted or proposed statutory schemes include a me-
diation measure.93 Mediation is a process whereby a neutral third
party attempts to assist in the resolution of disputes. Assistance
is offered through interpretation, suggestion, and advice. 94 Under
93. MMBA, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3501(e), 3505.2, 3507.1 (West Supp.
1976); PEERA, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3548 (West Supp. 1976); SB 275, §§ 3538-
39, at 26-27, 1975-76 Cal. Legislature, Reg. Sess. (1975).
The George Brown Act has no provision for mediation or any other im-
passe resolution mechanism in state employee-employer disputes. For a
general discussion of mediation, see 1973 ADv. CouN. REPORT 206-09. See
also W. Snv=, MEDIATION AND Tm DYNAI\Ics OF COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING
331-55 (1971).
94. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3501(e) (West Supp. 1976); 1975 CAL. LEGIS. ANA-
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MMBA, PEERA, and SB 275 the parties may agree on a mutually
acceptable mediator, and the parties divide the costs therefor.9 5
Under PEERA and proposed comprehensive bills such as SB 275,
when either the representative of the employer or the representa-
tive of the employee's organization declares the existence of an im-
passe, the party may request a state board to appoint a mediator.
In addition, if the board determines that an impasse exists under
PEERA, the board shall appoint a mediator, for whom the board
bears the costs.9 6 Under SB 275, when either party requests a state
appointed mediator, state appointment and payment would ensue.
91
In light of both the unilateral initiation of mediation and the state
payment of appointed mediators under PEERA and comprehensive
bills, continued use of mediation for impasse resolution can be an-
ticipated.
Will the state pay the costs of the mediator in Sealand's public
safety dispute over the twelve per cent pay increase? The answer
is no. The public safety workers are covered by NMBA, not by
PEERA. However, as of July 1, 1976, the public school teachers
in Sealand could secure a state appointed and remunerated medi-
ator in an impasse. Conversely, teachers at the University of Cali-
fornia, Sealand, are completely without a statutory impasse resolu-
tion procedure.
Apart from mediation, the table reveals MMBA provides no other
express devices for resolution of impasses reached by local public
employees. The MMBA, however, permits parties to consent to ad-
ditional procedures; MiMBA also allows local governments and
agencies to adopt reasonable rules and regulations that may include
provisions for additional dispute resolution procedures.9 8 Perhaps
predictably, the local option provision has resulted in widespread
variation of impasse mechanisms affecting California's more than
LYST 43; 1974 CAL. HEARInG 57; Impasse Resolution Mechanisms and Teach-
ers' Strikes, 7 U. Aicn. J.L. RFom-R 575 (1974); The State Conciliation
Service: Its Function in the California Public Sector, 17 C.P.E.R. 13 (June
1973); 1973 ADV. CouN. REPORT 207-09.
95. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505.2 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3548
(West Supp. 1976); SB 275, § 3538(b), at 26, 1975-76 Cal. Legislature, Reg.
Sess. (1975).
96. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3548 (West Supp. 1976).
97. SB 275 § 3538(b), at 26, 1975-76 Cal. Legislature, Reg. Sess. (1975).
98. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3505 & 3507 (West Supp. 1976).
900,000 local public employees.9 9 Recently, the Legislature has re-
sisted both specific recommendations and comprehensive bills which
would extend statutory impasse resolutions beyond the mediation
stage. After mediation has been discussed, the legislators, among
others,100 have thus far reached an impasse over other impasse pro-
cedures.
In the table at the beginning of this section, it is obvious PEERA
and SB 275 provide a new specific statutory impasse resolution-
fact-finding with recommendations. 0 1 PEERA's tripartite fact-
finding may be summarized in the following illustration:
(1) The Sealand public educational employees and employer
cannot reach agreement over a proposed pay increase. An employ-
ees' organization declares an impasse and requests the appointment
of a mediator. Unfortunately, the mediator cannot effect a settle-
ment. However, the mediator may determine fact-finding is appro-
priate, and the employee organization may thereafter request ap-
pointment of a fact-finding panel. 02
(2) The panel is tripartite: One member is selected by the em-
ployee association; one is selected by the employer; one is selected
by the state board. 03
(3) The panel meets with the parties and may conduct inquiries,
investigations, and hearings. In determining its findings and rec-
ommendations, the panel must consider certain criteria, including
applicable laws, party stipulations, public interests, public welfare,
financial ability of the public school employer, wage comparison
among comparable communities, and consumer price index. 04
(4) The panel's findings of fact and advisory recommendations
for settlement must be submitted first to the parties; the employer
must then publicly disclose the panel's report within ten days after
99. Compare Safety Services: Oakland Firefighters' Interest Arbitration,
24 C.P.E.R. 46 (March 1975) (voters approved charter amendment whereby
firemen impasses resolved by binding arbitration), with Safety Services:
Binding Arbitration Proposition, 25 C.P.E.R. 32 (June 1975) (voters disap-
proved similar proposed charter amendment). See also Safety Services:
Developments in Vallejo, 24 C.P.E.R. 54-56 (March 1975); the thirty-one
page agreement between the Vallejo Police Officers' Association and the city
includes fairly elaborate impasse resolution procedures.
100. See generally 1972 Cong. Hearings 31.
101. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3548.1-.3 (West Supp. 1976); SB 275, §§ 3539-
40, at 26-29, 1975-76 Cal. Legislature, Reg. Sess. (1975). See also 1973 Anv.
Couw. REPORT 209-14, 219-21.
102. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3548.1 (West Supp. 1976).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 3548.2.
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receipt.10 5 If the panel's recommendation is accepted by both the
Sealand employer and employees' organization, the interest dispute
is settled, and the impasse is circumvented. We shall assume the
panel recommends a ten per cent pay increase that the Sealand
School District refuses to accept.
A return to the table of measures for resolving interest disputes
makes it apparent that neither the MMBA nor the newly enacted
PEERA provides express statutory mechanisms beyond mediation
or mediation and fact-finding.10 6 Nevertheless, the table indicates
legislators should be at least cognizant of other impasse resolution
devices.
For example, the Legislature is doubtlessly aware of voluntary
but final and binding arbitration.10 7 Essentially, binding arbitra-
tion involves the final resolution of a dispute by a neutral third
party who considers the position of both parties. Under voluntary
binding arbitration, both the employer and employee agree to ac-
cept the decision of an arbitrator. Put differently, the parties may
submit to arbitration; but once they submit, they must accept the
decision. However, under compulsory binding arbitration, the par-
ties must submit to arbitration and must accept the decision. 08
One variation on binding arbitration was included as part of a
1973 model recommendation to the Legislature. 0 9 Binding arbitra-
105. Id. § 3548.3.
106. See also CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3548.5-.6 (West Supp. 1976); these
sections provide for a voluntary binding arbitration device for impasse reso-
lution. Note, however, that the arbitration is expressly limited to disputes
arising out of existing agreements. Therefore, the device is applicable to
rights disputes rather than interests disputes.
107. See 1973 ADV. Coux. REPORT 214-19.
Commentators have recently extolled the virtues and condemned the
vices of arbitration in the public sector. See generally McAvoy, Bindi7ig
Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Dis-
putes in the Public Sector, 72 COLum. L. REV. 1192 (1972); Overton & Wort-
man, Compulsory Arbitration: A Strike Alternative for Police, 29 ARB. J.
33 (1974); Wheeler, Is Compromise the Rule in Fire Fighter Arbitration?,
29 ARs. J. 176 (1974); Zack, Understanding Grievance Arbitration in the
Public Sector, 26 C.P.E.R. 2 (Sept. 1975).
One landmark California case on arbitration in the public sector is Local
1186 Fire Fighters v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 507 (1974).
108. See 1973 ADv. CouN. REPORT 214-19.
109. Id. at 31 of appendix A (proposed § 3512 [j]); SB 275, § 3542 (b),
at 31-32, 1975-76 Cal. Legislature, Reg. Sess. (1975).
tion was originally included in SB 275 and in similar bills. Under
SB 275, there was one exception to the strictly advisory status of
the fact-finding panel's recommendations. Specifically, the recom-
mendations were to have been accepted when the following had
occurred:
(1) Either the employer or employee rejects the -recommenda-
tion of the fact-finding panel;
(2) A superior court enjoins a public employee strike on the
ground that such a disruption would imminently imperil public
health or safety; and
(3) The court directs the parties to accept the panel's recommen-
dations.110
When these three acts occur, fact-finding becomes the equivalent
of compulsory arbitration. The transformation from advisory fact-
finding to compulsory arbitration would follow a readily foresee-
able route. First, one party, probably the employee organization,
unilaterally declares an impasse. Second, the mediator is requested
and appointed. Third, one party unilaterally requests fact-finding,
but the other party refuses to accept the recommendation. Finally,
because the court finds a threatened strike imperils public safety,
it enjoins the strike but also requires the acceptance of the panel's
recommendations. In short, under SB 275, advisory fact-finding has
the potential to become compulsory binding arbitration. 1 '
The preceding discussion reveals that SB 275 authorizes public
employee strikes if either party rejects the fact-finding panel's rec-
ommendations. When the public-peril exception precludes an au-
thorized strike, the employees secure, in effect, compulsory binding
arbitration. In the private sector, the authorized strike is consid-
ered the lubricant for the design of a reasonable and realistic bar-
gaining vehicle. 1 2 Likewise in the private sector, an agreement
to submit disputes to binding arbitration is ordinarily the quid pro
quo for the agreement not to strike. 13 Accordingly, the authorized
110. SB 275, § 3542(b), at 31-32, 1975-76 Cal. Legislature, Reg. Sess.
(1975).
111. See Wheeler, Is Compromise the Rule in Fire Fighter Arbitration?,
29 Ann. J. 176 (1974). Wheeler observed that although the employer's pro-
posals are often accepted by the arbitrator or factfinder, the employer
usually wins no new advantage when it wins because the original proposal
is generally made by the employees' organization. Id. at 180-81.
112. Alternatives, supra note 64, at 463. See also 1972 Cong. Hearings
87-88.
113. Feller, supra note 76, at 757. For an example of the United States
Supreme Court's adherence to the quid pro quo notion, see United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960).
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public sector strike under SB 275 may be viewed as an additional
mechanism for creating pressures to resolve impasses. If public
interests preclude the authorized strike, compulsory binding arbi-
tration is available under SB 275 in lieu of the strike mechanism.
In summary, the table on impasse resolution of interest disputes
reveals four enacted and proposed statutory schemes. Local em-
ployees may resolve interest disputes only by mediation unless local
rules provide procedures beyond MMBA. State employees do not
have a statutory impasse resolution device under the George Brown
Act. Public educational employees may use statutory devices of
mediation and advisory fact-finding. However, most public em-
ployees and employers could use mediation, advisory fact-finding,
and compulsory arbitration or authorized strikes under recom-
mended model legislation such as the proposed but defeated SB 275.
AN ANALYSIS OF FouR FEATURES EMERGING FROM THE
FOREGOING LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Feature 1: An Emerging Paradox
In 1972 the California Assembly expressed its concern about pub-
lic employees' increasing participation in work stoppages. More-
over, the Assembly explicitly recognized "the possibility of further
disruptions at an alarming rate."" 4 Thus the Legislature has rec-
ognized the need to prevent teachers' strikes." 5 Consequently,
under PEERA, the Legislature provides impasse resolution devices
-points one and two on the impasse resolution table. Are teachers'
strikes as disruptive as strikes by policemen and firemen? School
children do not ordinarily attend public schools at night, on week-
ends, or during extended vacations. If the Sealand public school
teachers walk out for the first two weeks after Labor Day, the chil-
dren may make up the days the following June. Additionally, the
teachers probably realize that they may make up the salary lost
during the strike." 6 Although teachers' strikes do result in dis-
rupted services, the temporary disruption may be less critical than
in other services. Nevertheless, PEERA expands impasse resolu-
tion devices for public education employment relations.
114. 1973 Amy. CouN. REPoRT 36 in appendix B.
115. Id.
116. See Alderfer, Follow-up on the Pennsylvania Public School Strikes,
25 LAB. L.J. 161 (1974).
The Legislature has expressed the need to prevent public safety
strikes. However, policemen and firemen can see only one statu-
tory hurdle between impasse and an unauthorized strike. Under
the MMBA, the Sealand public safety workers may elect to circum-
vent or engage in mediation. In any event, with mediation aside,
the public safety workers have no statutory alternative to the unau-
thorized strike other than to concede defeat. Public safety services
are provided and required twenty-four hours per day. Indeed, ces-
sation of police and fire protection could be chaotically and trag-
ically disruptive. Nevertheless, the table portrays the absence of
statutory devices to prevent future disruptions of critical services,
Paradoxically, the Legislature has expanded the devices for resolv-
ing teachers' disputes in which disruptions are at most incon-
venient but has declined to expand such devices for highly disrup-
tive public safety strikes.
Feature 2: An Emerging Fiscal Impact
There is a dearth of information regarding the fiscal impact of
legislation such as PEERA and SB 275. On June 16, 1975, the Cal-
ifornia Legislative Analyst estimated the fiscal effects of the pas-
sage of the bills. The estimated impact can be summarized as fol-
lows:
Fiscal Effect PEERA117 SB 275118
1. General fund appropriated for
initial support of Board: $ 200,000 $ 300,000
2. Estimated annual cost for support
of Board: 1,000,000 5,400,000
3. Mandated local program: Undetermined Undetermined
Moreover, the Legislative Analyst indicated: "Collective bargain-
ing by state employees would impose drastic changes in present
state personnel management and employee compensation practices
and would have a substantial impact on state costs.""19 The pre-
117. CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 160, 1975-76 Reg.
Sess. (Aug. 21, 1975). Although the Legislative Analysis estimates the an-
nual administrative cost of the Board at $100,000, the Institute of Industrial
Relations, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, estimates the cost to be $545,000. Id. at
2.
118. CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL No. 275, 1975-76 Reg.
Sess. (June 17, 1975). In this analysis, estimates of annual administrative
costs range from $3.6 to $5.4 million. Id. at 4. At 5, however, the analysis
portrays only the highest estimates of the costs. Compare the presentation
of the highest estimated costs at 5, with the presentation of the range of
estimated costs in 1975 CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST 54-58.
119. 1975 CAL. LEGIs. ANALYST 47.
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ceding costs and the idea of drastic changes were not widely her-
alded during the hearings on SB 275 and kindred proposals. Po-
tential fiscal impacts of other similar proposals may emerge as an
increasingly debatable feature in forthcoming proposed vehicles for
negotiations and impasse resolution. Under PEERA, approximately
450,000 public education employees are covered for an estimated
$1 million in administrative costs. Under SB 275, more than 1,000,-
000 state and local employees would be covered; however, the esti-
mated administrative costs may be as high as $5.4 million. The
fiscal impact of SB 275 was probably a quiet but potent factor in
its defeat. 120
Feature 3: An Emerging Peril
Testifying before a 1974 hearing on work stoppages in California,
one union official forthrightly predicted there will be "more and
more" strikes by firemen unless the laws are changed. 12' In addi-
tion, since 1972 the Assembly has recognized "the possibility of fur-
ther disruptions at an alarming rate.' 22  The union leader's and
the Assembly's forecasts were both accurate.
When public employees decide it is in their self-interest to disobey
the law, a peril to public order emerges. Self-interest is one under-
lying rationale for both obedience and disobedience of the law. For
example, self-interest is one motivation for most people to obey
traffic signals. Likewise, self-interest is apparently one motivation
for disobeying statutes which preclude proven methods for pressing
economic demands. In the absence of sufficient legal vehicles for
negotiation and resolution of interest disputes, the public may have
to face the peril of rewarding disobedient employees. 123
120. What are the alternate sources of funding for pay increases secured
through PEERA and SB 275? The scope of this article does not permit de-
tailed pursuit of this question. Briefly, if the Sealand teachers eventually
secure the ten per cent increase recommended by the fact-finding panel,
increased property tax assessments are likely to be the main source of addi-
tional income. In short, through PEERA, the Legislature provides another
mechanism under which local pay increases are financed by local tax in-
creases.
What is the source of funds for pay increases under SB 275? The main
source of funding would be the general fund. Thus, by defeating legislation
which could result in additional pay increases for state employees, the Legis-
lature perhaps averts the necessity of increasing state taxes.
121. 1974 CAL. HEARING 106.
122. 1973 ADV. Coum. REPORT 36 of appendix B.
123. See generally Hoover, Police, Firemen, Doctors: Self-Interest Erases
For example, the City of Sealand's "last offer" to the public safety
workers was a 3.5 per cent increase. The employees first held out
and then walked out, demanding a twelve per cent increase. We
have seen that existing legal sanctions are relatively limited in ter-
minating the disruption. Besides, it is axiomatic that the court
could not order the arrest of five-hundred policemen and firemen
for contempt. After residential and commercial properties were de-
stroyed by unattended fires, Sealand reconsidered its "last offer"
and agreed to a nine per cent pay increase. This article suggests
an emerging peril to the stability of social order in the Sealand
scenario. There is perhaps the risk of chaos when public employees
turn to the extreme behavior of disrupting vital community serv-
ices.
Feature 4: An Emerging Opportunity
The Legislature's enactment of PEERA, notwithstanding defeat
of SB 275, presents an opportunity. From the standpoint of the
public and public employees, SB 275 presented the advantage of
interposing additional impasse resolution devices between impasse
declarations and disruption of governmental services. The table
graphically depicts the absence of statutory mechanisms under bills
such as MMBA and GBA and the potential presence of statutory
mechanisms under proposals such as SB 275. Enactment of
PEERA perhaps represents middle-of-the-road progress. Neverthe-
less, the provision of additional impasse resolution devices pre-
sents an opportunity to experience statewide use of fact-finding.
In addition, there is an opportunity under PEERA to explore the
question of whether the shift in statutory language from "meet and
confer" to "meeting and negotiating" results in a statewide atmo-
sphere of discussions and bargaining among equals.
In the opening words of PEERA, the Legislature declares it is
a desirable state policy to expand the jurisdiction of the newly cre-
ated public education board to cover other employers and employ-
ees in the public sector.124 Such a legislative expansion would re-
sult in the transformation of the Educational Employment Rela-
tions Board into the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB) .125 In short, the 1975-1976 Legislature laid the foundation
Image of Folk Hero, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1975, § I, at 1, col. 1; Will, Social
Darwinism and Strikers, San Diego Evening Tribune, Aug. 30, 1975, at C-
2, col. 4; and Abel, The Law in San Francisco, San Diego Evening Tribune,
Sept. 5, 1975, at B-3, col. 1. See text accompanying notes 31, and 40-47,
supra.
124. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540 (West Supp. 1976).
125. Id.
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for expanding PEERA into a comprehensive public employment
statute. At least in part, the statutory transformation may be af-
fected by the extent to which the potential opportunities in PEERA
are successfully converted into positive accomplishments.
Disputes over interests, in both the public and private sectors,
are passing through certain phases in at least three paradigms or
models. The characterization can be related to emerging opportu-
nities in evolving public sector legislation.
Comparative Analysis of Phases and Paradigms
of Interest Dispute Resolutions
Phases
Paradigms I II III IV
A Negotiation Settlement
B Negotiation Impasse Settlement
C Negotiation Impasse Strike Settlement
Neither the phases nor the paradigms are intended to be exhaus-
tive. However, useful considerations may be gleaned from the
chart. For example, interest disputes in each model begin and end
with negotiation and settlement phases. Although settlement may
be merely an agreement to disagree, the employees nevertheless
continue to perform or resume performance of their functions.
Under paradigm A, an employees' organization may initially de-
mand a compensation increase of twelve per cent during phase I
discussions. If the employer offers a four per cent increase but
the parties compromise on an eight per cent increase, the discus-
sions under model A would be complete because the two essential
phases of negotiation and settlement have been completed.
Even though paradigm B begins with negotiation and ends with
settlement phases, an impasse phase has been added. For several
reasons the discussion mechanism, either through its design or use,
has temporarily become an inadequate vehicle for transporting the
parties to settlement. In the language of the Legislature, further
discussions become temporarily "futile."'1 26
Notwithstanding the impasse under model B, the parties may
eventually reach agreement without the employees resorting to the
126. Id. § 3540.1 (f).
strike. For example, the employees may demand a fourteen per
cent increase. The employer's counteroffer is four per cent. Al-
though the employer is willing to "compromise" the difference, the
offer is only for a five per cent increase and is presented on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis. If the employees "leave it" without leaving the
job, further negotiations become temporarily futile. So long as the
employees do not resort to the strike, the employer and employees
under paradigm B eventually settle. Either implicitly or explicitly
the parties agree to an increase at some rate within the four to
fourteen per cent range.
Model C demonstrates that disputes begin with negotiation of a
proposal and end with settlement. However, impasse and strike
phases are added to the route. When disputes pass through the
four phases of paradigm C, governmental services are disrupted.
In California, ninety-five per cent of public sector strikes of more
than one day are settled either by an agreement on terms or by
an agreement to submit the issues to a neutral party.127 If strikes
are almost invariably ended by agreement, striving to procure the
agreement before rather than after the governmental disruption is
a highly worthwhile undertaking.
CONCLUSION
In PEERA, the Legislature has taken another modest step in the
design of vehicles for negotiation and impasse resolution. PEERA
offers certain parties the opportunity to avert strikes in the course
of reaching agreement. Conceivably, the Legislature could further
help avert public sector strikes by enacting two measures: First,
the Legislature could amend PEERA to cover the remainder of state
and local public employees in California; second, the Legislature
could amend PEERA to include other impasse resolution devices.
Other states and countries have successfully enacted public sector
legislation providing a complete system of collective bargaining and
impasse resolution devices which include the right to strike.128 A
blanket proscription of public employee strikes does not work,12
for it may rob a bargaining vehicle of its usefulness and reason-
ableness.2'z
Under existing California statutes, there are either no, one, or two
impasse resolution devices for interest disputes. When public em-
127. Cal. Strikes 3.
128. See, e.g., PA. STAT. AnN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1975-76). See also
1972 Cong. Hearings 600-07.
129. Alternatives, supra note 64, at 470-75.
130. Id.
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ployees deem the statutory mechanisms inadequate, many have
demonstrated their willingness and ability to participate in unau-
thorized strikes to press their economic demands.
The legislative architects in California and the majority of other
states have at least two choices on public sector strikes. Legislators
may choose not to design improved vehicles for negotiation and res-
olution of impasses. Such a decision may indicate the Legislature's
intention to permit the public to endure the consequences of dis-
rupted governmental services. Alternatively, the Legislature may
choose .to design other vehicles for additional employees to avert
some, if not most, public employee strikes. In California more than
2,600 public employers, 1,000,000 public employees, and 20,000,000
residents may be affected by the Legislature's choice.
THomAs M. FIORELLO
